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Non‐human consciousness and the specificity problem: A modest theoretical proposal

Academic Journal article by Henry Shevlin

Non‐human consciousness and the specificity problem: A modest theoretical proposal. Mind & Language. 2021; 1– 18. https://doi.org/10.1111/mila.12338

Abstract: Most scientific theories of consciousness are challenging to apply outside the human case insofar as non‐human systems (both biological and artificial) are unlikely to implement human architecture precisely, an issue I call the specificity problem. After providing some background on the theories of consciousness debate, I survey the prospects of four approaches to this problem. I then consider a fifth solution, namely the theory‐light approach proposed by Jonathan Birch. I defend a modified version of this that I term the modest theoretical approach, arguing that it may provide insights into challenging cases that would otherwise be intractable.

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